Table of Contents
A data diode is a network device whose hardware lets data travel in only one direction, typically using a light source on one side and a light detector on the other. Placed at the edge of a control network, it lets data flow out to historians and AI systems while making it physically impossible for traffic to come back in.
Key takeaways
- NIST defines a data diode as a device that allows data to travel only in one direction, and notes that unlike a firewall it cannot be programmed to allow both directions, because the hardware is incapable (NIST SP 800-82r3).
- TCP needs acknowledgements, so ordinary client-server protocols cannot cross a bare diode. Unidirectional gateways add software that replicates historians and servers on the far side.
- A diode does not inspect content. It makes remote control and data theft through that link much harder, but does not stop a malicious file that rides through it (NCSC).
- Joint guidance on AI in OT recommends one-way transfer patterns and audited staging buffers where OT data must reach business networks (CISA et al., 2025).
- A diode only protects if it is the only path. Other connections, removable media and remote access routes still need controls.
What is a data diode?
NIST SP 800-82r3, the US guide to OT security, defines a data diode as "a network appliance or device that allows data to travel only in one direction". It is also called a unidirectional gateway, a deterministic one-way boundary device or a unidirectional network (NIST SP 800-82r3).
The difference from a firewall is where the rule lives. A firewall enforces direction in software, through rules that someone can change, open by mistake or bypass through a vulnerability. In a diode, the return path does not exist. NIST describes a common use: a diode at the boundary between the operational network and the enterprise network, letting traffic leave the operational network but not enter it.
How does a data diode work physically?
Most designs use an optical link with the return half removed. The security target of one data diode evaluated under the Common Criteria describes the principle: a light source and a corresponding photocell, connected by fibre-optic cable, so that signals can pass in only one direction. Its reverse data flow interfaces are physically disconnected, and once the device is manufactured its function cannot be altered (ADPICS Data Diode Security Target).
The same document shows the usual architecture: a proxy server on the source side, the diode hardware in the middle, and a proxy server on the destination side. The proxies handle the protocols; the hardware only guarantees direction.
Evaluation levels vary between products. That security target claims Common Criteria EAL 1, the lowest assurance level. When you compare products, ask which evaluation was done, at which level, and what was inside its scope.
Data diode, unidirectional gateway or firewall?
The terms overlap. NIST describes a unidirectional gateway as a combination of hardware and software: the hardware "is physically unable to send any information at all back to the source network", and the software "replicates databases and emulates protocol servers and devices" (NIST SP 800-82r3). One vendor of such gateways says its software copies historians, OPC DA servers and relational databases to identical servers on the IT network, where users work with the copies normally (Waterfall Security).
| Stateful firewall | Bare data diode | Unidirectional gateway | |
|---|---|---|---|
| How direction is enforced | Configurable rules | Hardware | Hardware, plus replication software |
| Can a configuration error open a return path? | Yes | No | Not through the hardware |
| TCP client-server sessions across it | Yes | No; connectionless traffic only | Ended on each side and replicated |
| Typical OT use | DMZ boundaries, filtered two-way flows | Connectionless feeds such as UDP streams | Historian, OPC and database replication out of OT |
| Commands or remote access back into OT | Possible if a rule allows it | Impossible over this link | Impossible over this link |
Why can't ordinary protocols cross a diode?
TCP, and most industrial protocols built on it, depend on the receiver answering: handshakes, acknowledgements, retransmission requests. A diode cannot carry any of these. The vendor quoted above states that a bare diode cannot take part in TCP/IP client-server conversations and is limited to connectionless protocols such as broadcast UDP (Waterfall Security).
Historians are a common case. The UK NCSC notes, in a fictional worked example, that "most conventional historian replication solutions require bidirectional TCP connections" and trust relationships between primary and replica systems (NCSC). Across a diode, the gateway's software must do the replication instead.
Some protocols are designed for one-way links:
- File delivery. FLUTE, an IETF standard, delivers files without needing any connection from receivers back to the sender. It gets reliability from forward error correction rather than retransmission, runs over UDP, and gives the sender no way to verify reception (RFC 6726).
- OPC UA PubSub. Publishers send messages "without knowledge of what, if any, Subscribers there may be", and the broker-less variant uses datagram protocols such as UDP (OPC UA Part 14). Whether a given diode product supports it is a question for the vendor.
The consequence is that the sender never knows what arrived. Detection of lost data has to happen on the receiving side, and the NCSC recommends monitoring for communication drop-outs when an optical flow control device is used (NCSC).
Where does a data diode sit in the Purdue model?
NIST gives an example: a unidirectional gateway between Levels 2 and 3 may protect Level 0, 1 and 2 devices from a cybersecurity event at Levels 3, 4 or 5 (NIST SP 800-82r3). A diode can also sit between Level 3 and the DMZ, so that the historian stays inside OT and a replica on the other side serves business users. Our guide to the Purdue model and where AI fits explains the levels.
France's cybersecurity agency ANSSI ties the strength of the one-way control to a classification of industrial systems from class 1 to class 4. Its detailed measures guide, published in French in November 2025, describes security functions rather than products, and recommends (ANSSI):
| ANSSI class | Recommendation on one-way flows |
|---|---|
| Class 2, with class 1 systems | Unidirectional flows, which a firewall can provide (R109) |
| Class 3, towards lower classes | Unidirectionality ensured by a unidirectional gateway (R111) |
| Class 4, towards lower classes | Unidirectionality that can be ensured physically by an ANSSI-qualified diode (R115) |
| Between IT and class 4 | Communications to be prohibited (table 3) |
This is French guidance, not Algerian law. It is a useful reference for French-speaking engineering teams, but confirm which national requirements apply to your site with counsel and the relevant authority.
What does a data diode not protect against?
A diode controls direction. It does not judge content, and it only protects the path it sits on.
- Malicious content. The NCSC states that one-way flow control "does not stop a vulnerability being exploited within the destination system", although it makes command and control and data export difficult (NCSC).
- Other paths. The same guidance warns that a capable attacker may use alternative export paths. The ADPICS security target assumes the diode is the only connection between the two zones. A vendor laptop, a 4G router or a forgotten remote access account defeats it.
- Data hidden in legitimate exports. The NCSC export pattern uses diodes so outside attackers cannot use the export channel to talk to malware inside, but notes a residual risk from malware hiding data in a legitimate export (NCSC).
- Weak controls elsewhere. In the NCSC worked example, the fictional operator decided a diode "would be undermined by weaker controls elsewhere" and used tightly ruled firewalls with a push-only design instead. A diode is worth most where the rest of the boundary is already strong.
Inbound transfers need their own path. Patches, antivirus signatures and model files must never travel back over the outbound diode. The NCSC import pattern places content transformation before the one-way flow control and verification after it. Our guide to air-gapped AI deployment applies this to model updates.
How do you feed AI systems through a one-way link?
The CISA-led guidance asks for push-based or brokered architectures that move "features or summaries out of OT" without persistent inbound access (CISA et al., 2025). A diode enforces this by design. These steps keep the project workable:
- List what the AI needs. Tags, sampling rates, alarms, batch records, lab results. Send that, not the whole control network.
- Choose a mechanism for each data type. Historian replication for time series, file transfer for reports and exports, UDP-based publishing where supported. The NCSC example uses CSV and JSON snapshots of tagged data.
- Make the IT side the only place AI reads from. A replica historian or staging database with read-only accounts, never a connection towards OT. Our guide to process historian data for machine learning covers the data itself.
- Detect gaps on the receiving side. Use sequence numbers or record counts, alarm on drop-outs, and flag missing periods so models do not train on holes.
- Size buffers for outages. Decide how long the source side can store data if the link or the receiving server is down.
- Accept that nothing flows back. AI output reaches the process as a recommendation an operator applies, which matches the guidance on keeping a human in the loop. See adding AI to OT security.
- Design the inbound path separately. Updates for the source-side proxy and OT systems need their own controlled route.
For the rest of the integration, see integrating AI with SCADA and OT systems and anomaly detection methods, a typical use of replicated historian data.
What we have seen at KABAS AI
DALILE runs completely offline on your own servers and connects to SAP, Oracle, Microsoft 365, LIMS, document management systems and SQL databases. It reads documents and data; it does not need to write to control systems. That makes it compatible with a one-way design: it can sit on the business side and work from replicated data and reports, with no connection towards OT.
Designing integrations under that constraint leads to three practical recommendations.
Write the data contract before choosing the device. The list of tags, files, formats and frequencies decides whether a bare diode is enough or a gateway with replication software is needed.
Involve the control team from day one. They own the source side, the proxy that sits in OT and the procedure for updating it.
Treat the replica as a product. Give it an owner, monitor its freshness and completeness, and tell users when data is missing. AI built on a silent gap gives confident wrong answers.
Our information systems team maps and connects systems such as SCADA, MES, LIMS and ERP, and can help design the data flows for a site that uses one-way transfer.
Sources
- NIST SP 800-82r3, Guide to Operational Technology (OT) Security, September 2023
- CISA, ASD's ACSC and partners, Principles for the Secure Integration of Artificial Intelligence in Operational Technology, 3 December 2025
- NCSC, Pattern: Safely Importing Data
- NCSC, Design Pattern: Safely Exporting Data
- NCSC, Secure Connectivity: Operational OT Data Export Example
- ANSSI, La cybersécurité des systèmes industriels : mesures détaillées, ANSSI-PA-108, 27 November 2025
- Attila Cybertech, ADPICS Data Diode Security Target, version 4.0, 2021
- Waterfall Security, Data Diode and Unidirectional Gateways, 2023
- IETF RFC 6726, FLUTE: File Delivery over Unidirectional Transport, 2012
- OPC Foundation, OPC UA Part 14: PubSub, section 4
Frequently asked questions
Is a data diode the same as a firewall?
No. A firewall decides what passes using rules, and a rule change can open traffic in both directions. A data diode's hardware can only send in one direction, so no configuration change can create a return path. NIST SP 800-82r3 presents the unidirectional gateway or data diode as an alternative to a firewall at OT boundaries.
Can an AI model still send setpoints to the plant if we install a data diode?
Not over that link. A diode installed to send data out of OT physically cannot carry anything back in, including setpoints or commands. AI results then reach the process the way current guidance recommends anyway: as recommendations that an operator reviews and applies through the existing control system.
How do software updates reach a network protected by an outbound data diode?
Through a separate, controlled inbound path, never through the outbound diode. That path may be a one-way import gateway or a removable media procedure. The UK NCSC import pattern recommends transforming content before the one-way flow control and verifying it after, because a diode alone does not stop malicious content.
Can data be lost across a data diode?
Yes, and the sender cannot find out directly, because no acknowledgement can come back. Unidirectional protocols such as FLUTE use forward error correction instead of retransmission. In practice, add sequence numbers or record counts so the receiving side can detect gaps, and monitor the link for drop-outs.
Which guidelines recommend data diodes for industrial systems?
NIST SP 800-82r3 lists unidirectional gateways and data diodes among OT segmentation options. France's ANSSI recommends a unidirectional gateway for flows from its class 3 industrial systems to lower classes, and an ANSSI-qualified diode for class 4. These are US and French documents; Algerian operators should confirm which requirements apply to them with counsel and the relevant authority.



